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external interest rate developments. One reason for the capital outflow prior 
to  July  1987 was  that  Bank  Indonesia had  kept  the  SBI rate  flat  for a 
relatively  long  period,  causing  domestic  interest  rates  to  diverge  from 
international  interest  rates.  In  a  financially  open  economy  like  that  of 
Indonesia,  it  is essential  to recognize  that  external  shocks will  frequently 
make tradeoffs among interest rate stability, domestic income stability, and 
exchange rate stability inevitable. 
It  is  clear from the manner in  which  the  monetary  contraction  of  June 
1987 had to be implemented that the market for both SBI and SBPU was still 
too shallow. It may be difficult to increase their role if the financial markets 
remain underdeveloped.  Financial deepening is an important priority, but not 
only  because  of  the  need  to  enhance  the  effectiveness of  the  monetary 
instruments.  Financial  deepening would  also better  mobilize  (and  maybe 
increase)  domestic  savings,  reduce  dependence  on  external  credit,  and 
improve the overall allocation of  capital within the economy. 
One of the first steps that could be undertaken to boost development of the 
financial sector would be to privatize some of the state enterprises. It would 
certainly ease Indonesia’s external debt burden if a minority portion of these 
state enterprises were sold to foreigners.  The possible  increase in efficiency 
of  these enterprises would be an added bonus. 
6  Exchange Rate Policy 
6.1  Introduction 
In chapter 3 we identified an important political constituency (technocrats, 
Javanese  peasants,  and  Outer  Island  residents)  which  is  opposed  to  the 
maintenance  of  an overvalued  exchange rate. We  will  show in this chapter 
that  this  constituency  has  been  successful  in  influencing  exchange  rate 
policy,  with  the  result  that  there  is  an  asymmetry  in  policy  response  to 
changes  in  the  balance  of  payments.  It  makes  good  economic  sense  to 
devalue the real exchange rate  when  a balance-of-payments  deficit  occurs, 
but due to the existence of this constituency it makes good political sense not 
to allow the real exchange rate to revalue  when  a surplus occurs. The fact 
that the institutional memory was impressed by the potency of the exchange 
rate in effecting economy-wide resource reallocation  and income redistribu- 
tion during the 1966 economic rehabilitation program helps to strengthen the 
economic argument  for  a  devaluation  whenever  the  balance-of-payments 
situation demands it. This exchange rate policy, as we will argue in chapter 
7,  played  a  crucial  role  in  helping  Indonesia  to  avoid  a  debt  crisis  in 97  IndonesidChapter 6 
1982-84  because  it  maintained  a  large  and  healthy  tradable  sector  and 
discouraged capital flight. Given  the  crucial role of  the exchange rate  in 
external debt management, we focus on exchange rate management in some 
detail. 
The statistical profile of  the rupiah-dollar exchange rate  in  figure 6.1 is 
characterized by three distinct phases. The first phase, from October 1966 to 
July 1971, saw a steady dismantling of the multitiered exchange rate system 
into a  unified  exchange rate,  revealing a  readiness to  have  medium-sized 
devaluations at short intervals. In the second phase, from August  1971 to 
October  1978, there was  a fixed exchange rate.  The third phase occurred 
from November 1978 to March  1987 and was a time of  large devaluations 
separated by moderately long periods of  gradual exchange rate depreciation. 
Since these three phases reflect policy responses to changes in the external 
environment and to developments internal to Indonesia, we will use them as 
a convenient way  to organize our discussion of  Indonesian exchange rate 
management. The discussion of phase 3 will revolve around the November 
1978, March 1983, and September 1986 devaluations. 
6.2  Phase 1, Pre-August  1971 
When  the  New  Order government of  General Soeharto  took  power  in 
October 1965, it inherited a system of multiple exchange rates.'  This system 
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its administration, it also made smuggling an extremely profitable business. 
Since the array of exchange rates was set to promote domestic industrializa- 
tion  and  extract  revenue  for  the  government,  the  exchange  rate  system 
discriminated against the  traditional  agricultural commodity exports.  The 
fact  that  the  whole  exchange  rate  structure  had  become  increasingly 
overvalued because of chronic high domestic inflation meant an acceleration 
in  the  pace  of  resource  shift  away  from  export  activities.  Many  rural 
residents abandoned the cultivation of tree crops for subsistence farming. 
The Soeharto regime made  the maintenance of  a competitive exchange 
rate and the simplification of  the exchange rate system a key element in its 
economic rehabilitation program. A unified exchange rate was achieved in 
April 1970 when the government set its major import exchange rate (Bonus 
Ekspor, BE) to be  the same as that of  the then free market exchange rate 
(Devisa Pelangkap,  DP) of  378 rupiahs to the dollar.2 The government in 
this period displayed no reluctance to change the exchange rate whenever it 
seemed that a balance-of-payments problem was appearing. 
Exchange  rate  realignments  were  quite  frequent,  with  medium-sized 
devaluations  undertaken  at  short  intervals  in  order  to  preserve  the 
competitiveness of  Indonesian goods in the face of high domestic inflation 
rates.  A good example is the August  1971  devaluation which brought the 
exchange rate  to  415  rupiahs to  the  dollar.  This  devaluation was  clearly 
implemented  in  response to  the  worsening  of  the  current account deficit, 
which widened from 3.4 percent of  GDP in 1970 to 4.0  percent in 1971 (see 
table 6.1). The deterioration in the balance of payments was partly the result 
of  a slowdown in world economic growth and partly the result of  the real 
appreciation of  the rupiah  caused by  the relatively higher inflation rate  in 
Indonesia during 1969 and 1970. 
6.3  Phase 2, August 1971 to October 1978 
The exchange rate remained at 415 rupiahs/dollar for a record seven years. 
The reason for this remarkable stability was straightforward: the balance of 
payments was very strong throughout the period. The current account deficit 
during phase 2 stayed below the 1971 figure of 4 percent of GDP (see table 
6.2).  The largest current account deficit occurred in  1975, 3.6  percent of 
Table 6.1  Background to the August 1971 Devaluation (in percentages) 
I969  1970  1971  1972 
Current account balance to GDP  -4.0  -  3.4  -4.0  -3.0 
Industrial countries’ GDP growth rate  4.9  2.7  3.5  5.2 
Industrial countries’ inflation rate  4.1  5.6  5.2  4.6 
Indonesia’s inflation rate  17.4  12.3  4.4  6.4 
Source: International Financial  Sfatistics, 1986 yearbmk. 99  IndonesidChapter 6 
Table 6.2  Economic Conditions During Rriod  of  Fixed Exchange Rate, August 1971 to 
November 1978 
~~ 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1917  1978 
Current balance as %of GDP  -3.4  -4.0  -3.0  -2.9  2.3  -3.6  -2.4  -0.1  2.7 
Current account receipts as 
% of  GDP  13.6  14.8  17.2  20.7  29.1  23.1  23.6  23.9  22.0 
Nongold reserveslimports 
(in weeks)  8.1  8.7  19.1  15.3  20.2  6.4  13.7  20.9  20.4 
GDP growth rate (8)  6.5  7.0  9.4  11.3  7.6  5.0  6.9  8.9  7.7 
Inflation rate (%)  12.3  4.4  6.4  31.0  40.6  19.1  19.8  11.0  8.1 
GDP,  when the rosy  economic prospects induced by  the oil boom caused 
both private and public spending to soar. 
The proportion of  national income from current account receipts leaped 
from the 1970-72  average of  15 percent to an average of 24 percent during 
1973-78.  The fear of  a balance-of-payments crisis was never further away 
from  the  authorities’  minds;  there  was  little  fear  of  not  being  able  to 
accommodate  any  short-run  speculative  flight.  The  level  of  nongold 
reserves,  measured  as the  number  of  weeks  the  nongold reserves  could 
sustain existing import levels, was consistently higher than the 4.8 weeks of 
the  1967-69  period  and  the  12  weeks  of  the  1970-72   period^.^  The 
impressive balance-of-payments performance  is  largely  due  to  the  rapid 
development of  the petroleum and LNG sectors and the fourfold oil price 
increase at the end of  1973. 
Besides the  absence of  a balance-of-payments reason  for changing the 
exchange rate,  the macroeconomic conditions of  this  period also did  not 
warrant any additional stimulus which a devaluation would surely bring. The 
sustained high income growth rates of this period were without precedent in 
the Soekarno years. This high average income growth rate of 7.9 percent was 
achieved with substantial overheating of the economy-the  average inflation 
rate was 22 percent compared with the 8 percent of  1970-72. 
6.4  The November 1978 Devaluation 
For most observers the devaluation of  the rupiah on  15 November 1978 
was a surprise. While it was generally agreed that the real exchange rate had 
appreciated significantly since 1971 and that there would be a need  in  the 
future, when oil reserves were closer to depletion, to devalue in order to 
boost  nonoil  exports,  there  was  little  expectation  of  an  immediate 
deval~ation.~  There  were  no  signs  that  the  balance  of  payments  was 
deteriorating-the  current account deficit was 2.7  percent of  GDP in  1978 
and 0.1 percent in  1977, compared with 2.4 percent in  1976 and 3.6 percent 
in  1975. There were, in fact, numerous speculations in the Indonesian press 
during  April  and  May  1978 that  a  revaluation of  the  rupiah  might  be 100  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
necessary  given  the  plunge  of  the  dollar  vis-6-vis  the  other  major 
currencie~.~ 
Many explanations have been offered for the timing of  the exchange rate 
realignment but they all tend to be combinations, with different emphasis, of 
two  main  interpretations.  In  the  first  interpretation  the  November  1978 
devaluation is seen as an anticipatory action to the inevitable dropoff in oil 
export earnings due  to  resource depletion.6 Arguments in  support of  the 
anticipatory devaluation interpretation are: (1) that it is better to act before a 
balance-of-payments crisis actually develops because this would prevent the 
financial chaos attendant upon a speculative outflow of domestic capital; and 
(2) since exports and imports react to relative price changes with substantial 
lags, a devaluation during a balance-of-payments crisis would  have to  be 
larger than  is  really  necessary  in order  to  have  any  immediate beneficial 
effects. 
The  second  interpretation  emphasizes  the  economic  difficulties  and 
political tensions associated with the reallocation of  resources being forced 
upon  the economy by  the overvalued exchange rate. The overvaluation of 
the rupiah was  the result of  maintaining the exchange rate at 415 rupiahs/ 
dollar despite the large domestic inflations from  1974 to  1977. This meant 
that Indonesian producers of  tradables were experiencing a profit squeeze- 
the prices of  their output were  fixed by  international competition, but  the 
prices  of  their domestic inputs were  being  driven up  by  the double-digit 
inflation. The result was reports of increasing unemployment in the tradables 
industries, particularly in the labor-intensive agricultural export sector. The 
stagnation  of  the  manufacturing  export  industries was  worrying  because, 
being of  a labor-intensive nature,  they were looked upon as the means to 
soak up the natural increases in the labor force. Indonesia was suffering from 
the Dutch disease. The growth of the extremely capital-intensive oil industry 
caused  the  real  exchange  rate  to  appreciate,  hence  decimating  the 
labor-intensive tradables  industries.  Since  the  oil  industry  constituted  an 
enclave export sector with minimal linkages to the rest of the economy, the 
steady movement of resources into the service (nontradables) industries was 
a threat to the long-run growth rate of the economy. 
The  movement  of  resources  out  of  the  rural  sector  was  hastened  by 
another  development.  Protection  was  increasingly  granted  to  import- 
competing industries in  order  to  offset  the  profit  squeeze caused  by  the 
overvalued rupiah, and this protectionist policy deteriorated the rural-urban 
terms of  trade. Politically, the distress in the rural sector was undermining 
the efforts of the Soeharto regime to prevent the resurgence of the PKI, and 
it was also raising inter-island tensions because the Outer Islands depended 
heavily on the export of  agricultural products.  Given these economic and 
political costs of  the Dutch disease, it was therefore not surprising that the 
government devalued, even in the absence of a balance-of-payments crisis.7 
Max Corden (1982) has aptly labelled the use of the exchange rate to protect 101  IndonesidChapter 6 
the tradable sector for reasons unrelated  to balance-of-payments consider- 
ations as “exchange rate protection.” 
The  anticipatory  devaluation  interpretation  and  the  Dutch  disease 
interpretation could both be right. They do not contradict each other. It must 
be  mentioned,  however,  that  anticipatory devaluations are extremely rare 
events,  not  only  by  the  past  experiences  of  other  LDCs  but  also  by 
Indonesia’s  own  history  of  devaluations.  Devaluations,  including  the 
Indonesian ones prior to  1978 and those of  1983 and  1986, usually occur 
either  in  the  midst  of  a  balance-of-payments problem  or  when  one  is 
imminent. And as shown in table 6.2, the level of foreign reserves in  1978 
would have been able to sustain the existing amount of  imports longer than 
at any time during the 1970-76  period. Further, the anticipatory devaluation 
explanation can be judged plausible only if  it explains why the technocrats 
reacted  quite  differently  in  1978  toward  potential  balance-of-payments 
problems than at any time before or after 1978. 
It must be admitted, however, that the alleged deleterious effects of  the 
Dutch disease on the nonoil export sector are not obvious. Nonoil, nonLNG 
exports, whether measured in physical units or in dollars or in  the units of 
imports for which they can be exchanged, show steady growth throughout 
the Dutch disease period of  1972-78  (see the first three columns in  table 
6.3). The 1975 dip in export earnings is due to a recession in the industrial 
Table 6.3  hrfomance of Nonoll NonLNG Exports (1974 =  100) 
Physical  Foreign Purchasing  Domestic Purchasing 





























































Memo item: Average annual growth rate of  nonoil exports in  1973-78  period. Exports in  US.  dollars 
Indonesia  Malaysia  Thailand  South Korea  Hong Kong  Singapore 
Growth rate (70)  15.5  32.3  19.9  30.6  19.0  20.0 
Nore:  Physical volume from deflating rupiah value series by  nonoil export price index. Foreign purchasing 
power from deflating U.S. dollar value series by export unit value of  industrial countries. Local purchasing 
power  from  deflating  rupiah  value  series  by  Indonesian  CPI.  The  CPI  contains  prices  of  imported 
consumption goods in its construction. 
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countries rather than to a fall in domestic production. The fact that the value 
indices of columns 1, 2, and 3 went up in  1979 and 1980 only shows that a 
devaluation  is  effective  in  increasing  supply  rather  than  that  there  was 
stagnation in the nonoil export sector. 
The  production  disincentive  faced  by  the  nonoil  export  industries  is 
clearly seen only when one measures the amount of local purchasing power 
which their exports are able to command (see column 4 of table 6.3). Even 
though the nonoil exports were bringing  in  increasing amounts of  foreign 
goods, the steady real appreciation of the exchange rate meant that the nonoil 
export industries were not being paid a greater number of baskets containing 
the mix of goods typically consumed by Indonesians. The first three measures 
show that  total export  earnings in  1976 and  1977 were at unprecedented 
heights, whereas the fourth measure puts the 1976 and 1977 earnings below 
that of  1973. In  terms of  foreign purchasing power (column 3), the nonoil 
export industries increased their revenues by  32 percent between 1973 and 
1978, but their revenues were unchanged  if  measured in local purchasing 
power. 
Another indicator that the Indonesian tradables sector was suffering from 
the Dutch disease is its poor growth performance compared to Malaysia and 
Thailand,  which exported  similar products (see memo item in table 6.3). 
The  respective annual growth  rates  of  nonoil  exports  over  the  1973-78 
period for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were  16 percent, 32 percent, 
and 20 percent, respectively. The most telling comparison is with Malaysia, 
which  had  an  oil  boom  like  Indonesia and  which  also kept  its  currency 
fixed (almost) to the dollar. The big difference was that the average annual 
inflation rate  for  Malaysia  was  7.5  percent  as  against  Indonesia’s  21.6 
percent. 
Table 6.4 gives the prices of the five largest agricultural exports, measured 
in different ways. Other than the price of coffee, the other agricultural prices 
move  more  or  less  in  tandem.  Again,  because  of  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation, the foreign purchasing power measures (item a) of  palm oil, 
rubber, log,  and plywood prices gave a less bleak picture of  the  1974-78 
period than the local purchasing power measure (item b). The average fall in 
prices was  12 percent  by  the first  measure, but  29 percent by  the second 
measure. Local purchasing power is the relevant measure for assessing the 
degree of profit squeeze on the smallholders. 
To  smooth out individual price deviations, as in the case of coffee prices, 
in  table  6.4,  aggregate  price  indices  were  constructed  to  study  overall 
movements  in  the  ratio  of  prices  of  tradables to  prices  of  nontradables, 
PT/PN  (see  table  6.5).  Two  proxies  for  the  ratio  were  obtained  by  (1) 
normalizing the output price indices of  several sectors by  the CPI  and (2) 
normalizing the sectoral prices by the housing component of the CPI.8 Since 
housing cost is a more direct proxy for nontradables, we would expect the 
second ratio to move more than the first. 103  IndonesidChapter 6 
Table 6.4  Commodity Price Indices (1974= 100) 
Coffee  Palm Oil  Rubber  Logs  Plywood 






























































(b) In terms of  real exports from industrial countries 
1969  103.5  51.1 
1970  129.4  74.7 
1971  108.4  71.6 
1972  111.6  55.5 
1973  113.9  59.5 
1974  100.0  100.0 
1975  95.8  84.9 
1976  188.2  64.2 
1977  280.9  85.0 
1978  168.6  78.6 
1979  159.7  76.0 

























(c) In terms of baskets of domestic 
1969  102.3 
1970  133.0 
1971  122.0 
1972  136.7 
1973  129.0 
1974  100.0 
1975  89.8 
1976  146.6 
1977  213.1 
1978  134.4 
1979  181.5 
1980  137.1 
:ally consumed goods (real rupiah prices as given by CPI) 
50.5  122.7  86.2 
76.7  102.1  94.7 
80.6  81.0  98.5 
67.9  76.1  91.7 
67.4  117.5  117.7 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
79.6  63.4  69.7 
50.0  71.6  79.2 
64.5  69.7  69.6 
62.6  77.2  66.2 
86.4  123.9  143.3 





































In  our opinion, the most reliable indicators of PT/PN are the normalized 
wholesale price indices of imports and of nonoil exports. This is because: 
1. Beginning in  1974, some segments of the  manufacturing sector started 
receiving  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  to  protect  domestic 
industries  hurt  by  the  real  appreciation  and  to  promote  import 
substitution. Goods sheltered by  quantitative restrictions are  effectively 
nontradables  from  the  analytical  viewpoint.  This  is  because  imports 
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prices.  With  a  given  quota,  prices  of  the  domestically  produced 
substitutes are  insulated  from  international  price  movements  and  move 
only in response to changes in domestic demand and cost conditions.' 
2.  Rice is a very large portion of domestic agricultural output, and its price 
has been deliberately set to increase slightly more than CPI movements in 
order to promote the goal of self-sufficiency in rice. Prices of a number of 
other food crops such as corn, soybean, and sugar are also protected from 
external  competition.  This  means  that  tree  crops are the  main  tradable 
component of the agricultural sector. 
Part (a) of table 6.5 shows that,  except for agriculture,  wholesale prices 
normalized  on  the  CPI  show  a  downward  trend  from  1973  to  1978, 
indicating  pressure  on  producers  of  tradables  to  shift to nontradables.  We 
suspect that it is for the reasons given above that the production incentive in 
the  manufacturing  sector  fell  less  than  in  the  general  tradables  sectors. 
Judging  from  the  normalized  export and  import indices,  the  incentive  to 
produce tradable as against the general basket of consumption goods fell 22 
to 27 percent between  1973 and  1978." 
When prices  were normalized by  the nontradable price variable,  housing 
cost, all series showed a downward trend (see part b of table 6.5). Again, 
the differences in the decline of  the series, PT/PN, reflect the fact that the 
food  component  of  agriculture  is essentially  a  nontradable  because  of  the 
self-sufficiency  goals, and that the manufacturing sector has been receiving 
increasing quota protection over the period. In this direct measure of FT/PN, 
the  production  disincentive  increased by  about 26 percent  in  the  1973-78 
interval. 
Table 6.5  Indicators of Tradable-Nontradable  Price Ratio, PT/PN (1974= 100) 
Wholesale F'rices  1971  1972  1973 
(a) Relative to Jakarta CPI 
Imports  105.9  111.1  107.0 
Exports, nonpetroleum  90.2  88.9  107.0 
Agriculture  90.2  100.0  102.8 
Manufacturing  103.9  107.4  114.1 
(h) Relative to housing component in Jakarta CPI 
Imports  75.0  82.2  91.6 
Exports, nonpetroleum  63.9  65.8  91.6 
Agriculture  63.9  74.0  88.0 
Manufacturing  73.6  79.5  97.6 
(c) Morgan Guaranty's 
competitiveness measure  114.1  127.1  120.3 
1974  1975  1976  1977  197V 
100.0  91.6 
100.0  69.7 
100.0  98.3 
100.0  89.9 
100.0  87.2 
100.0  66.4 
100.0  93.6 
100.0  85.6 
100.0  87.3 
81.8  76.7  78.3 
72.0  83.0  84.3 
102.8  113.2  116.9 
88.1  88.1  92.2 
74.5  66.3  65.3 
65.6  71.7  70.4 
93.6  97.8  97.5 
80.3  76.1  16.9 






















Note:  Part (a) and (b) are calculated from table 3 in Wan (1986), but some of our calculated numbers differ from the 
calculations in his table 4. The series in this table and those in table 6.7 are not comparable because the definition of 
wholesale  price  index  changed over the  two  periods. The competitiveness measure is  from  inverting the  Morgan 
Guaranty real exchange rate. 
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6.5  Effects of the 1978 Devaluation 
The 50 percent devaluation caused a much bigger jump in the normalized 
nonoil export prices than in the normalized import prices; on average, a 24 
percentage point jump in the former versus 8 percentage points in the latter. 
The minor improvements in  the normalized manufacturing and  agricultural 
prices may reflect the significant use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) which 
have  pushed  these  goods  closer  to  the  nontradables  category.  The  24 
percentage point improvement in relative prices for the tradable sector may 
not be an exaggeration because the rise in the Morgan Guaranty measure of 
competitiveness was even more substantial-32  percentage points. l2 
The  speed and  size  of  the  response of  nonoil,  nonLNG  exports  were 
extremely impres~ive.'~  The devaluation happened at the end of  1978, and 
the expansion of  nonoil exports in  1979 was considerable according to all 
four of the earning measures used in table 6.3. Export volume went up by 36 
percent in one year, raising dollar earnings by  52 percent. Measured in units 
of  exports from industrial countries, the value growth from the  1978 level 
was  32 percent in  1979 and  27  percent  in  1980. This  growth  in  foreign 
purchasing power translated into domestic purchasing power increases of 78 
percent in  1979 and 65 percent in  1980. The nonoil export response caused 
the  nongold  reserves of  the  central bank  to swell from  twenty  weeks  of 
imports at the end of  1978 to twenty-six weeks in the third quarter of  1979, 
just  before  the  OPEC-2  October  price  increase  further  boosted  official 
reserves. What  makes this  export  achievement particularly notable is that 
1979 was the beginning of the slide into the deep recession of  1982. The real 
GDP of the industrial countries grew only 3 percent in 1979 and 0.6 percent 
in 1980, compared to a 1976-78  average of  4.4 percent. 
While the big response by nonoil exports may not be surprising given the 
large devaluation, what may not have been expected at the outset was the 
speed of the response. This is because the bulk of Indonesian nonoil exports 
is  agricultural  raw  materials  and  minerals,  with  manufactured  exports 
averaging only 6.7 percent of nonoil exports in the 1972-78  period.  l4  Since 
the supply of  both of  these primary commodities is typically assumed to be 
inelastic in the short run, either because of their long gestation periods (tree 
crops)  or  their  heavy  capital-intensive nature  (minerals),  the  36  percent 
expansion in the physical volume of nonoil exports in 1979 was bewildering. 
The quick response is proof of  the Dutch disease. The mounting severity 
of  the Dutch disease since 1974 caused an increase in excess capacity in the 
traditional export  industries. Small producers of  tree crops were  spending 
more and more of  their time in  nontradable activities as the real prices of 
their agricultural products sank with the maintenance of  a constant nominal 
exchange rate in the face of big domestic price increases. Another source of 
the excess capacity in the agricultural raw  materials sector was that, given 
the low  real  prices,  producers were not  fully exploiting the now  matured 106  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
trees  planted  in  the  early  1970s  in  the  wake  of  the  stabilization  and 
rehabilitation of the economy. Hence, production was easily increased when 
PT/PN was improved by the 50 percent devaluation. 
The above point is very  well brought out by  table 6.6 which shows the 
value of  nonoil exports before and  after the November  1978 devaluation. 
Total  nonoil exports,  measured in dollars,  went up by  54 percent in fiscal 
1979.  l5 The rates of increase for the seven biggest nonoil export items were 
all at the two-digit level: timber, 91 percent; rubber, 42 percent; palm oil, 16 
percent; coffee, 41 percent; animals and animal products,  19 percent; and 
manufactured  goods,  82 percent.  The  sizable expansion of  the  tree  crop 
Table 6.6 
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exports-rubber,  palm oil, and coffee-and  tin exports testified eloquently 
to  the presence of  excess production capacity in  these industries prior to 
1979. The large reaction of manufactured exports was particularly gratifying 
to the technocrats who had advocated the devaluation because they viewed 
the labor-intensive manufactured industries as a crucial sector for Indonesian 
industrialization and the creation of employment.  l6 
6.6  The March 1983 Devaluation 
Management of  the exchange rate after the  1978 devaluation was much 
more  flexible;  the  rupiah  glided  gently  downward  against  a  basket  of 
currencies to  compensate for  the  higher  inflation  rate  in  Indonesia.  The 
OPEC-2 shock in November 1979, however, unleashed external and internal 
forces which led ultimately to the 38 percent rupiah devaluation in March 
1983.  Specifically,  the  doubling  of  oil  prices  provoked  the  industrial 
countries  to  tighten  their  monetary  policies  to  ward  off  the  cost-push 
inflation, and the result was three years of negligible growth with its nadir in 
1982 when  the  world  experienced  its  deepest  recession  since  the  Great 
Depression. 
At  the same time, the great inflow of  oil revenue caused the Indonesian 
government to augment its investment spending as dictated by the balanced 
budget rule.  Because of  the primitive state of  domestic financial markets, 
ruling  out  the  use  of  open  market  operations  by  the  central  bank,  the 
conversion of  the dollar-denominated oil revenue by  the  government into 
rupiah  expenditure led  to  an  explosion  of  the  money  supply.  As  in  the 
aftermath of  the OPEC-1 shock, Bank Indonesia temporarily lost control of 
the  money  supply.  Reserve  money  grew  by  28  percent  in  1979 and  40 
percent  in  1980.  The  result  was  that  the  expected  one-time  price  level 
increase due to the November 1978 devaluation was given new momentum; 
the inflation rate was  18.5 percent in  1979 and  12.2 percent in  1980. The 
inflation rate would have been higher if  stagnation in the industrial countries 
had not exerted a moderating effect on prices via lower import prices. 
The internal shock of  high inflation, which appreciated the real exchange 
rate,  and the external shock  OF  low OECD growth caused the balance of 
payments to deteriorate. The slowdown of the OECD economies shifted the 
demand  for  Indonesian  exports  downward,  and  the  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation decreased the supply of  nonoil exports. The import price index 
normalized  by  housing cost  went  from 74 to 66 in  the  1979-82  period, 
while the Morgan Guaranty competitiveness index declined from 11  1  to 80; 
a fall of  10 and 20 percent, respectively (see table 6.7). The consequence of 
these  internal  and  external  shocks  was  that  both  the  volume  and  real 
domestic value of nonoil exports in  1982 were half of their 1979 level. The 
current account deficit was a record 6 percent of GDP, with reserves falling 
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Table 6.7  Background to Devaluations of 1983 and 1986 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
(a) General economic conditions 
Income growth in industrial 
Real price of  oil in foreign 
Indonesian inflation rate (W) 
Indonesian growth rate (Q) 
(b)  Balance-of-payments situation 
Merchandise exports to GDP (%) 
Current account balance to GDP (8) 
Reserves to imports ratio (weeks) 
External long-term public 
(c) Nonoil export sector (1974  = 100) 
Import price deflated by  housing cost 
Export price deflated by  housing COSI 
Competitiveness B la Morgan Guaranty 
In physical volume 
In  local purchasing power 
In  foreign purchasing power 
nations (W) 
purchasing power (1980= 100) 
debt service 10 exports (%I 
3.4  1.3 
67.7  100.0 
20.6  18.5 
6.3  9.9 
27.5  27.9 
1.9  4.0 
29.3  25.9 
13.5  7.9 
65.2  62.8 
99.0  101.0 
111.3  101.1 
160.0  144.5 
184.6  170.8 
162.4  155.9 
1.4  -0.4  2.7  4.7  3.0  2.4 
119.2  124.1  111.6  109.1  104.1  59.1 
12.2  9.5  11.8  10.5  4.7  5.9 
7.9  2.2  4.2  6.6  1.1  2.4 
25.2  20.8  23.1  24.3  21.4  21.4 
19.6  9.7  11.8  17.9  20.5  23.0 
8.2  10.6  12.8  14.7  20.1  29.3 
-0.7  -5.9  -7.8  -2.5  -2.1  -4.3 
63.0  56.9  63.2  59.8  58.2  57.7 
89.0  79.5  98.4  91.8  92.7  109.7 
90.2  80.3  100.9  115.5  129.2  142.7 
111.8  93.5  148.1  175.0  188.5  222.4 
118.1  107.3  142.6  169.3  177.0  168.2 
91.1  80.5  105.9  102.9  98.4  98.9 
Note:  IWPN proxies for 1983 are for post-March devaluation and for 1986 are pre-September devaluation. PT/PN 
proxies here are not comparable to those in table 6.5 because of changes in the definition of  price indices. This is why 
the 1979 and  1980 figures in this table are different from table 6.5. 
The balance-of-payments picture worsened in  the first quarter of  1983. 
Imports continued to  grow  with  no  sign  of  export recovery,  and  capital 
outflow  started accelerating. The  category of  errors  and  omissions, into 
which  the  official  balance-of-payments  account  put  all  private  portfolio 
capital flows, soared from  -$0.6  million in  1979 to over  -$2.0  billion 
annually  during  1980-82.  The  weak  export  earning  together  with  this 
avalanche of  capital outflow caused total nongold reserves  to  fall to  5.3 
weeks of imports by  the end of the first quarter of  1983. 
The  grim  balance-of-payments picture  at  that  point  was  definitely the 
reason for the 38 percent devaluation. An economic stimulus coming at the 
time when the economy was growing at 2.2 percent was an added incentive 
to devalue. Because Mexico was unable to meet its debt service in August 
1982 and two other borrowers, Argentina and Brazil, were on the brink of a 
debt crisis, it was prudent for Indonesia to take some preventive measures, 
especially since the price of oil was moving downward. It seems likely that 
the  external  debt  did  not  play  more  than  a  cautionary  role  in  the 
government’s decision  to  devalue in  1983. Although  the  external public 
debt-service ratio rose from 8 percent in  1980 to 11 percent in  1982, it was 
still  well  below  the  1981 (pre-crisis) Mexican  debt-service  ratio  of  28 
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The March  1983 devaluation restored PT/PN back to the level set by  the 
devaluation of November 1978. The response of the nonoil export sector was 
impressive, as in the previous devaluation-exports  expanded 26 percent in 
physical volume and 58 percent in local purchasing power. The reason the 
1983 nonoil export levels (in real terms) were significantly lower than the 
1979 levels, even though the value of the real exchange rate was the same in 
both instances, is that foreign demand was much lower in 1983 than in 1979. 
Real GDP of industrial countries grew 2.7 percent in 1983, compared to 3.4 
percent in 1979. Nevertheless, the increase in nonoil exports was enough to 
shrink the current account deficit to 2.5 percent of  GDP in 1984. 
Manufacturing  exports  grew  especially  rapidly,  jumping  from  $850 
million in fiscal 1982 to $1,480 million in fiscal  1983, and then to $2,166 
million in fiscal 1984 (see table 6.8).  It is noteworthy that a greater variety 
of manufactured goods were being exported because of the favorable PT/PN. 
Manufactured goods in the “others”  category shot up by 300 percent in real 
terms in just two years. This reaction of the manufacturing sector strongly 
indicates that export-oriented industrialization is a real possibility as long as 
favorable relative prices are maintained  through  appropriate exchange rate 
and trade policies. 
It must be emphasized that the government supported the 1983 exchange 
rate devaluation with conservative macroeconomic policies. Both monetary 
and fiscal policies were tightened. The latter was done by massive postpone- 
ment of capital-intensive (hence, import-intensive) projects and by increasing 
tax revenue through streamlining a cumbersome tax system. The government 
budget deficit went from Rp 13 billion in 1982 to Rp 10 billion in 1983, and 
then to Rp 0.5 billion in  1984.”  The conservative macroeconomic policies 
succeeded in keeping inflation to just a shade over  10 percent in  1983 and 
1984, hence preventing a fast reversal of the real depreciation of the exchange 
rate. 
The  government  may  also  have  sought  to  improve  the  trade  balance 
directly  by  rapidly  expanding the  list of  import  items  subject to  quotas. 
While  imposition of  quotas  may  be  due  largely  to  the  efforts  of  infant 
industries advocates and rent-seekers, the timing of the flood of quantitative 
Table 6.8  The Response of the Manufacturing Sector to the March 1983 Devaluation 
(in millions of dollars) 
1982183  1983/84  1984/85 
Plywood  320  580  697 
Textiles and clothing  I80  360  519 
Electrical appliances (e.g., T.V..  semiconductor, transistor)  1 LO  130  I35 
Total manufactured exports  850  1,480  2,166 
Source:  World Bank (1985, 20; 1986, 91; 1987a, 16). 
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restrictions seems to suggest a role for balance-of-payments considerations 
as of November 1982. The increased protectionism may help the balance of 
payments in the short run, but the quota form of protectionism (for reasons 
given in  section 6.8 below) is counterproductive in  the medium and  long 
run. Quantitative restrictions could very well have contributed substantially 
to the need for another devaluation in September 1986. 
6.7  The September  1986 Devaluation 
The world  economy showed no signs of returning to sustained economic 
growth after the deep 1982 recession. There was a spurt of  activity in 1984 
(see table 6.7) which was normal after such a deep recession and was helped 
along by  the large U.S. budget deficits. But U.S. budget deficits could not 
keep on widening indefinitely in order to provide the same stimulus. In 1985 
the growth rate in the industrial countries slowed down to 3.0 percent. After 
the middle of  1986 it was clear that immediate growth prospects were lower 
than anticipated. The IMF revised its growth rate projections for industrial 
countries downward, from 3.0 to 2.7 percent for 1986, and from 3.2 to 3.1 
percent for 1987 (IMF 1986b, 1986~).  The actual 1986 growth rate turned 
out to be even lower than the midyear forecast; it was 2.4 percent.19 
For Indonesia, the slow global economic recovery translated directly into 
uncharacteristically low  oil and commodity prices. The average oil price in 
fiscal 1985 was $25 per barrel, and it fell to $13 per barrel in fiscal 1986.*’ 
The nonoil  terms of  trade  also turned harshly against Indonesia with  the 
result that even though nonoil exports increased by  10 percent in physical 
volume, their value decreased by  5 percent in  terms of foreign purchasing 
power.  Despite the adoption of  stringent macroeconomic policies and  the 
steady  floating  down  of  the  exchange  rate  from  970  rupiahs/dollar in 
1983:lQ to  1,131 rupiahs/dollar in  1986:2Q, the  current account  deficit 
doubled to 4.3 percent of GDP from 2.1 percent. 
Added to the balance-of-payments problems of  1986 was a quickening of 
the rise in  the external public (medium- and  long-term) debt-service ratio 
since 1984. The 1986 debt-service ratio stood at 29 percent, the same level 
as the Mexican debt-service ratio in  198  1. The primary factors behind this 
drastic rise were the export collapse, which decreased the denominator, and 
the  “uncontrollable”  increased  debt  payments,  which  increased  the 
numerator. The increased debt-service payments were termed ‘  ‘uncontrolla- 
ble”  because  since  less than  30 percent  of  Indonesia’s external debt  is 
denominated in U.S. dollars, the drastic drop of  the dollar against the other 
currencies accounted for more than 70 percent of the $1.1 billion increase in 
annual debt service over the  1984-86  period (World Bank  1987a). Given 
that Japan is Indonesia’ biggest creditor (36 percent of debt), as well as its 
biggest trade partner, the 29 percent dollar depreciation against the yen in 
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chief export, oil, and paying yen  for its imports and for a third of  its debt 
service. 
With the worsening of  the trade balance, the growing shadow of a debt 
crisis, and  the slowing down of  economic activities, the September 1986 
devaluation of  45 percent against the dollar was the single most effective 
step Indonesia could have taken to simultaneously improve its capacity to 
earn foreign exchange and stimulate its economy. 
6.8  Relative Prices and the 1986 Devaluation 
While  it  is  clear  that  negative  external demand  shock  had  a  role  in 
worsening the balance of payments, we want to point out that there were also 
internal developments over this period which caused substantial movements 
in  relative  prices  unfavorable  to  the  tradable  sector.  Specifically,  the 
widespread use of  QRs in the  1980s depressed the outputhnput price ratio 
faced by  the tradable sector and caused the supply of nonoil exports to fall. 
Our point  is that  the introduction of  QRs on the  imported inputs of  the 
tradables  sector  transfers  part  of  the  profits  previously  received  by  the 
producers of  tradables to the holders of the input quota. QRs on inputs and 
real exchange rate appreciation are alike in  that they  both  cause a profit 
squeeze in the tradables sector.21 
The use of  QRs has a long history. (QRs take the form of  either import 
licenses or quotas.) The first use of QRs in the Soeharto regime was in 1970, 
and by the end of  1971 twenty-four items were under this form of protection. 
The use of  nontariff barriers increased significantly throughout the  1970s, 
partly in response to the Dutch disease squeeze on the profit margins of the 
import-substituting industries.22 In  November  1982,  when  the  balance- 
of-payments situation looked precarious, the use of QRs accelerated.  23 By 
1985 QRs were undoubtedly the dominant form of protection in Indonesia. 
The pervasiveness of  QRs is very well shown in table 6.9. Of  the 5,229 
items imported in  1985, 1,484 required import licenses and 296 were under 
quotas. The import licenses were usually given to only two or three traders 
or to the few firms producing the competing goods domestically. The method 
of  license  issuance effectively conferred monopoly  status on  the  license 
recipient. Quotas spanned the whole spectrum from zero to a discretionary 
quantity decided by  a  bureaucrat  at the  time the  import application was 
submitted. License restrictions covered 30 percent of total import value. The 
range of  activities protected by  import licenses accounted for 32 percent of 
total domestic value added (excluding construction and  services).24 If  the 
petroleum sector, which requires no protection, is also excluded, then the 
coverage is 53 percent of total domestic value added. 
The types of goods under QRs is very diverse, ranging from basic inputs 
to consumption goods. Basic inputs under monopoly import licenses include 
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Table 6.9  Import Licensing in 1985 
Agriculture  Minerals  Manufacturing  Total 
Number of CCCN items 
Total  1,024  139  4,066  5,229 
Under license  122  2  1.360  1.484 
Under quota  64  1  23 1  296 
Total  127  1,451  8,082  8,987 
Under license  170  I  2,539  2.710 
In sector  40.6  42.4  17.0  100.0 
Under license  21.4  .I  10.3  31.8 
Import value" 
Share of  value addedb 
Source:  Central Bureau of  Statistics,  Indonesia,  and World Bank staff estimates. 
Nore:  CCCN = Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature. 
"In millions of U.S. dollars. Based on CBS data for 1985, which vary from balance of payments estimates for 
1985186 
"In percentages. Based on the 1980 input-output table. Excludes construction and services. Due to differences 
in classification, these numbers may vary from national account estimates. 
is clear that protectionism is not always extended for infant industry reasons; 
for example, there is no domestic producer of cold-rolled steel. In the case of 
plastic  inputs  (where  there  is  one  domestic  producer),  the  monopoly 
importer  imposed  an  administrative  fee  for  each  raw  material  which 
amounted to about 18 percent of its value, resulting in a 30 to 40 percent rise 
in costs to the end users.26 
The  implication  of  this  microeconomic  distortion  for  exchange  rate 
management is profound. The intrusion of this distortion since late 1982 and 
its  quick  metastasis  across  the  tradable  sector  renders  invalid  drawing 
conclusions from the movements of the macroecnomic proxies for PT/PN, as 
we did for table 6.5. This is because the introduction of quotas on inputs to 
the  tradables  sector reduces the sector's  production incentive for a given 
PT/PN. Output prices of tradables are set by international competition, while 
output prices of  nontradables (which are generally very labor-intensive) are 
set by the domestic cost structure whose level is determined by, primarily, 
domestic wages on the supply side and domestic macro conditions on  the 
demand side. Hence, the introduction of a quota on an imported input to the 
tradables sector will reduce the profitability of  the tradable sector without 
any change in  the proxies  for PT/PN.  The fact that  in  table  6.7 the  two 
proxies  for PT/PN  in  predevaluation  1986 are  at  least  as favorable as  in 
postdevaluation 1979 does not imply that the production incentive (measured 
in  terms of  local purchasing power) has not worsened if  we  abstract from 
demand conditions. 
The economic effects of  a QR can be modelled by  the addition of another 
cost, henceforth called rent, to the production of  the good. The limit of  the 
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and  by  the  cost  of  ~muggling.~’  The  existence  of  this  rent  imposes  a 
potential  check  on  the  ability  of  devaluation  to  restore  international 
competitiveness.  This  is  because  the  effectiveness  of  a  devaluation  in 
boosting production of  tradables depends crucially on its ability to raise the 
domestic output price without a corresponding  rise in the domestic cost of 
nontraded domestic inputs. As a first approximation,  a devaluation works by 
increasing  the  real  profits  of  the  tradable  sector  by  cutting  the  real  wage 
(which  is  more  easily  achieved  if  austere  macro  policies  are  undertaken 
simultaneously). 
We  can think of  the QR-introduced  rent  as a payment  for a nontradable 
input  service.  Since there  is  no competitive  determination  if  this  rent,  its 
level is at the  discretion of  the  monopoly  import license  holder.  How the 
license  holder  reacts  to a  devaluation  determines  the  effectiveness  of  the 
devaluation in boosting production of tradables.  If the license holder keeps 
the rent constant, either in nominal terms or in local purchasing power, then 
production of  tradables will increase as long as the costs of other nontraded 
inputs fall in terms of local purchasing power. However, if the license holder 
increases  his  rent  so  that  the  loss  of  other  nontraded  inputs  is  entirely 
transferred to him, then the production level will remain unchanged. 
As  a  practical  matter,  it  may  be reasonable  to assume that  the  license 
holder is usually not able to scoop all of the “released  payments,”  and hence 
devaluation would in most cases increase the output of tradables. This means 
that a devaluation  in  the presence  of  QRs will  have to be  larger  than  one 
undertaken in their absence in order to achieve the same output response. We 
can say that the August 1986 real exchange rate was overvalued in the sense 
that  the  introduction  of  QRs  caused  a  drop  in  the  supply  of  nonoil 
exportables which a devaluation would be able to offset. 
The point  we  want to emphasize  is that  although  the  Morgan  Guaranty 
competitiveness index in predevaluation  1986 shows almost the same value 
as in postdevaluation  1979 (110 versus  lll), it does not  indicate  that  the 
August  1986 exchange rate was not  overvalued.  In order to have the  1986 
nonoil  export  supply  schedule  in  the  same  position  within  the  familiar 
Marshallian  price-quantity  space  as  in  1979,  a  devaluation  was  clearly 
warranted  in light of the shrunken gap between output and input prices.28 It 
is of course an empirical question  how  much  the  additional  nonoil  export 
earnings would have been in the absence of QRs, especially in comparison to 
the fall in oil export earnings.  The current account  deficit would  still have 
widened in  1986, but it may not have doubled as it did.29 